Europe Faces Uphill Battle for Tech Sovereignty as Forrester Forecasts Slow Progress Through 2030

The pursuit of comprehensive technological sovereignty across Europe is increasingly viewed as an aspirational goal rather than a near-term reality, according to new research from Forrester. In its "Global Sovereignty Forecast 2025 to 2030," the consultancy suggests that the continent’s efforts to decouple from United States-based technology providers are likely to stall, with only marginal gains expected over the next five years. While the rhetoric surrounding "digital destiny" and independence has intensified within the European Union, the structural dependencies on American hyperscalers and software ecosystems appear too deeply entrenched to be dismantled quickly.

Forrester’s report introduces a specialized "Tech Sovereignty Index," a metric designed to quantify a nation’s capacity to develop, operate, and secure critical technologies without external reliance. The index examines several pillars of independence, including software self-sufficiency, hardware manufacturing capabilities, and the resilience of underlying energy and data center infrastructures. The findings present a sobering outlook for Europe’s major economies. Between 2025 and 2030, Germany’s sovereignty score is projected to move from 34% to just 36%. Similarly, the United Kingdom is expected to see a negligible increase from 30% to 32%. These figures suggest that despite billions of euros in planned investment and aggressive legislative agendas, the needle of true independence is barely moving.

The Evolution of the Tech Sovereignty Movement

The concept of technological sovereignty in Europe did not emerge in a vacuum; it is the result of a decade of escalating tensions regarding data privacy, economic competition, and geopolitical stability. To understand the current impasse, it is necessary to look at the timeline of events that pushed sovereignty to the top of the European agenda.

The movement gained significant momentum following the 2013 Snowden revelations, which raised alarms about the reach of US intelligence services into European data. This eventually led to the implementation of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in 2018, which established a framework for data residency and privacy. However, the legal landscape became more complex with the passage of the US Cloud Act in 2018, which granted US law enforcement the authority to request data from US-based providers regardless of where that data is physically stored.

In 2019, Germany and France spearheaded the Gaia-X initiative, an ambitious project intended to create a federated European data infrastructure. The goal was to provide an alternative to US cloud providers that adhered to European values of transparency and interoperability. However, Gaia-X has been hampered by bureaucratic delays and internal disagreements over the inclusion of American firms, leading many to view it as a missed opportunity.

The urgency increased in 2020 following the "Schrems II" ruling by the Court of Justice of the European Union, which invalidated the EU-US Privacy Shield. This created a legal vacuum for transatlantic data transfers, forcing European organizations to reconsider their reliance on American clouds. Most recently, the 2024 unveiling of the European Commission’s technological sovereignty package marked a formal legislative attempt to bolster domestic capabilities in artificial intelligence (AI), semiconductors, and open-source software.

The Stranglehold of US Hyperscalers and SaaS Ecosystems

A primary obstacle identified by Forrester is the overwhelming market dominance of the "Big Three" cloud providers: Amazon Web Services (AWS), Microsoft Azure, and Google Cloud. Collectively, these firms control approximately 65% of the European cloud market. Dario Maisto, a principal analyst at Forrester and lead author of the report, notes that this dominance is not merely a matter of market share but of technical architecture.

Many modern Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) applications are built natively on these hyperscaler platforms. They utilize proprietary Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) and specialized services—such as serverless computing and advanced database management—that are not easily portable to other environments. For a European enterprise, moving away from a US hyperscaler is rarely a "lift and shift" operation; it often requires a complete re-architecting of the software stack.

The dependency extends deep into the corporate office. It is estimated that seven out of ten international SaaS solutions are headquartered in the United States. Platforms such as Salesforce, Workday, and ServiceNow have become the backbone of European business operations over the last two decades. Maisto argues that expecting organizations to replace billions of dollars in accumulated investment and specialized training "overnight" is unrealistic. For most companies, the transition would not be a "greenfield" project where they start from scratch, but a painful and expensive "retrofit" of legacy systems.

Hardware and Infrastructure: The Silicon Deficit

Beyond software and cloud services, Europe faces a significant deficit in hardware manufacturing and design. While the EU Chips Act aims to double Europe’s share of global semiconductor production to 20% by 2030, the current reality remains stark. According to Forrester, Europe currently accounts for less than 10% of global chip manufacturing and a mere 1% of global chip design.

The region lacks the massive design firms capable of competing with US giants like Nvidia, Qualcomm, or Intel. Without domestic control over the silicon that powers AI and high-performance computing, European tech sovereignty remains a hollow concept. Furthermore, the report highlights "persistent dependencies" in the supply chain for raw materials and energy infrastructure. The data centers that power the digital economy require consistent energy and specialized cooling hardware, much of which is sourced from global supply chains that Europe does not fully control.

Hype vs. Reality: The Analyst’s Perspective

Dario Maisto suggests that the current fervor for tech sovereignty is partially driven by industry hype. Service providers often use "sovereignty" as a marketing buzzword to differentiate themselves and capture government contracts. However, from a strictly regulatory standpoint, the mandates are often less stringent than the rhetoric suggests.

Maisto points out that while there are specific requirements regarding data residency (where data is stored) and the citizenship of individuals handling sensitive workloads, there is no overarching international or national regulation that legally mandates "tech sovereignty" as a whole. Instead, what exists is a patchwork of compliance requirements.

This has led to what Maisto calls the "minimum viable sovereignty model." Rather than attempting to build a completely independent tech stack, many European organizations are focusing on the bare minimum required to ensure legal compliance and mitigate the most immediate geopolitical risks. This pragmatic approach acknowledges that full independence is currently impossible and focuses instead on "managing dependencies rather than avoiding them."

Regional Efforts and Official Responses

Despite the pessimistic forecast from analysts, European governments continue to push forward with sovereign initiatives. In April 2024, the French government announced a significant shift, stating plans to move 2.5 million government devices away from Microsoft Windows in favor of Linux-based operating systems. David Amiel, the French minister of public action and accounts, framed this as a necessary step to "regain control of our digital destiny" and reduce reliance on American tools.

At the EU level, the Technological Sovereignty Package remains the centerpiece of the region’s strategy. The package focuses on four critical areas:

1. Artificial Intelligence: Investing in domestic AI models and high-performance computing centers to ensure European values are embedded in AI development.
2. Cloud and Edge Computing: Supporting the development of "sovereign cloud" solutions that offer higher levels of data protection and local control.
3. Open Source: Encouraging the use of open-source software to prevent vendor lock-in and increase transparency.
4. Semiconductors: Executing the EU Chips Act to secure the hardware supply chain.

While these initiatives are "moves in the right direction," as Maisto admits, they are often seen as reactive measures to a global landscape where the US and China have already established a massive lead in the digital economy.

Broader Impact and Long-term Implications

The inability to achieve true tech sovereignty has profound implications for Europe’s economic and political future. Without a domestic tech ecosystem that can compete on a global scale, European firms may remain "digital vassals" to foreign platforms, paying a "tech tax" in the form of licensing fees and cloud costs that flow out of the region.

Furthermore, the lack of sovereignty creates a strategic vulnerability. In an era of increasing geopolitical volatility, the ability of a foreign power to restrict access to critical software or hardware could be used as leverage in diplomatic or economic disputes. The recent trend toward "protectionism" in the tech sector suggests that the globalized, open-market approach of the early 2000s is being replaced by a more fragmented, "walled garden" model of regional tech blocs.

Forrester’s analysis suggests that the next five years will be characterized by a "sovereignty reality check." Organizations will likely move away from the idealized vision of total independence and toward a model of "resilient dependency." This involves diversifying providers, investing in interoperability, and ensuring that—while the tools may be foreign—the data and the decision-making processes remain firmly under European control.

Ultimately, the report concludes that while Europe may never achieve the 100% sovereignty some politicians dream of, the effort itself is valuable. By building better hardware design capabilities and fostering a more robust domestic cloud market, Europe can at least improve its bargaining power. The goal for 2030 is not necessarily to be "free" of US technology, but to be in a position where that technology is a choice rather than an absolute, inescapable necessity.